It Happened and it Can Happen Again: The International Response to Genocide in Rwanda by Peacock, Dorinda Lea
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 22 | Number 3 Article 4
Summer 1997
It Happened and it Can Happen Again: The
International Response to Genocide in Rwanda
Dorinda Lea Peacock
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dorinda L. Peacock, It Happened and it Can Happen Again: The International Response to Genocide in Rwanda, 22 N.C. J. Int'l L. &
Com. Reg. 899 (1996).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol22/iss3/4
It Happened and it Can Happen Again: The International Response to
Genocide in Rwanda
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This comments is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation:
http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol22/iss3/4
COMMENTS
"It Happened and It Can Happen Again":
The International Response to Genocide in Rwanda
I. Introduction ......................................................................... 900
II. W hat is G enocide? ................................... .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903
III. The Jewish Holocaust of World War II .............................. 906
IV. The Genocide in Rwanda .................................................... 911
A. Rwanda's Colonial History ........................................... 911
B . Civil W ar in 1990 .......................................................... 913
C. Genocidal Acts (April-June 1994) ................................ 914
D. Subsequent Refugee Crisis ............................................ 918
V. Applicability of the Genocide Convention ......................... 921
A . Prevention ..................................................................... 922
B . Punishm ent .................................................................... 926
VI. Similarities Between the Jewish Holocaust
and R w anda ......................................................................... 930
VII. Policy Arguments for an International
Approach to Genocide ........................................................ 932
V III. Conclusion ......................................................................... 941
We have managed to forget Auschwitz and Buchenwald;
perhaps we could never really believe or understand them in the
first place. They seem to have been some horrifying intrusion, a
prolonged nightmare that we have suppressed and prefer not to
discuss. And yet it happened and it can happen again or worse.
-Jack Bemporad, The Concept of Man After Auschwitz'
I Jack Bemporad, The Concept of Man After Auschwitz, in OUT OF THE
WHIRLWIND: A READER OF HOLOCAUST LITERATuRE 477, 478 (Albert H. Friedlander ed.,
1968).
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I. Introduction
On November 15, 1996, after more than two years of suffering
in camps near Goma, Zaire, a stream of over 300,000 Hut
refugees began trudging back into Rwanda.2 The refugees had fled
Rwanda in 1994 after Tutsi rebels gained control of the country.
As Hut, they feared that they might be the targets of Tutsi
reprisals for the Hut-led massacres of ethnic Tutsi between April
and June of 1994.! The Hutu refugees were forced to remain in the
camps by the Hutu militia and former-government army members,
many of whom were suspected of perpetrating the massacres and
of later continuing their campaign against the Tutsi from the
camps in Zaire.4
The refugee exodus came just as the United Nations Security
Council approved a plan for deploying a multinational force to
assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the more than one
million Rwandan refugees now further displaced by fighting in
Zaire.5 As the Security Council considered what effect this new
activity would have on the need for international intervention,
President Clinton reaffirmed his commitment to international
action.6 After more than two years of turmoil in Central Africa
marked by refugee crises, civil war and genocide,7 during which
2 See Dele Olojede, Hutu Refugees Stream Home, THE NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 16, 1996, at Al. Because the events referenced in this Comment
took place prior to the overthrow of Zaire's dictator Mobutu Sese Seko and the creation
of the new government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the name Zaire will be
used throughout this work.
3 See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REP.: 4TH QUARTER 1994
UGANDA/RWANDAiBURUNDI 24 (1994) [hereinafter EIU 4TH QUARTER 1994].
4 See id; see also infra notes 80-106 for a description of the massacres and the
suspected perpetrators.
See Olojede, supra note 2, at A16. The fighting between Zairian Tutsi rebels,
known as Banyamulenge, and the Zairian army began in October 1996 after the deputy
governor of the South Kivu province ordered all Tutsi, long deprived of citizenship, to
leave Zaire within six days. See Kevin Fedarko, Death Cries of a Nation as Two
Countries Near Full-Scale War, A Million Refugees Set Up Camp and Brace for a
Massive Catastrophe, TIME, Nov. 11, 1996, at 46.
6 See Steven Erlanger, Role of U.S. force in Zaire to be Reassessed, THE NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 16, 1996, at A16.
7 Genocide is the attempt to destroy, through killing or other specified acts, a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group. See Convention on the Prevention and
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the United States and the international community maintained a
careful distance, the President's remarks took an ironic turn: "The
world's most powerful nation must not turn its back on so many
desperate people and innocent children who are now at risk."8
The events in Rwanda since 1994 raise many questions about
the obligations of the international community and the United
Nations in dealing with violence and slaughter within one nation's
borders. Fifty years ago, the atrocities of Nazi Germany served as
a catalyst for the formation of the United Nations and the
international commitment to the promise: "never again."9 The
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide more specifically sought to fulfill this promise by
defining the crime and articulating the international community's
belief that genocide was "contrary to the spirit and aims of the
United Nations and condemned by the civilized world[.]"'"
However, comparing the United Nations' response to recent
genocidal events with the Allied governments' response to the
plight of the Jews during the Holocaust suggests that the promise
is a hollow one. One critic, writing before the April 1994 eruption
of violence in Rwanda, noted of the United Nations' response in
the former Yugoslavia that:
[I]t would be as well to examine the mistakes of the past forty-
five years: in particular, the consistent unwillingness and
apparent inability of the member-states of the United Nations to
intervene in the "sovereign affairs" of one of their own number;
and their consequent failure to invoke-even once-4he United
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. II, 78 UNTS 277 [hereinafter
Genocide Convention]. See infra notes 23-38 for a detailed analysis of the term and its
application in international law.
8 Erlanger, supra note 6, at A16. Critics charge that the Clinton administration
led the Security Council in its ambivalence toward events in Rwanda. See Holly
Burkhalter, The Question of Genocide: The Clinton Administration and Rwanda,
WORLD POL'Y REV., winter 1994, at 44. See also infra notes 156-62 and accompanying
text for a discussion of U.S. actions during the crisis in Rwanda.
9 Alain Destexhe, The Third Genocide, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1994-95, at 3.
The United Nations, which met for the first time in April 1945 in San Francisco, was
formed with the optimistic objective of resolving international conflicts. See DONALD
KAGAN ET AL., THE WESTERN HERITAGE SINCE 1300, at 998 (1987) (caption to
photograph). Thus, the "new world order.., would 'never again' permit the sort of
horrors that had so recently sprung from Nazi Germany." Destexhe, supra, at 3.
10 Genocide Convention, supra note 7.
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Nation's Genocide Convention of 1948.11
This unwillingness to be proactive in preventing the crime of
genocide has serious implications for the future. For example, the
decolonization of Africa and elsewhere has already led to an
increase in conflict and violence. 2 This type of political
atmosphere can serve as the necessary catalyst for genocide. 3
Instead of turning away, the United Nations, through the Genocide
Convention, has the obligation to intervene and ultimately to
punish perpetrators of this heinous crime.
14
This Comment will explore the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the
context of the Jewish Holocaust and apply its mandate for
prevention to the situation in Rwanda. First, Part II will look at
the origin of the term "genocide" and its definition as spelled out
in the 1948 Convention. 5 Next, Part III will briefly review the
history of the Jewish Holocaust, focusing in particular on evidence
of the Allied governments' knowledge of Nazi atrocities and
opportunities these governments might have had for intervening. 6
Following this, Part IV will outline the history of the Rwandan
conflict, including background on the country's colonial history,
recent civil war punctuated by the genocidal acts of April-June
1994, and the subsequent refugee crisis involving its neighbor
Zaire." Part V will analyze the application of the Genocide
" Ronnie Landau, Never Again?, HIST. TODAY, Mar. 1994, at 6.
12 See id. at 8 (noting the chaos resulting from decolonization as a political context
for genocide). See also notes 211-21 and accompanying text for further discussion of
decolonization and other potential factors which trigger genocide.
13 See Landau, supra note 11, at 8.
14 See Genocide Convention, supra note 7. See infra notes 29-35 (describing the
terms of the Convention); see also Jennifer A. Widner, States and Statelessness in Late
Twentieth-Century Africa, DAEDALUS, Summer 1995, at 129. Fearing this tendency to
turn away, Melissa Wells, the U.S. Special Envoy to the Sudan, "remarked that the
spectacle of spreading conflict in central Africa may engender such despair that it will
lead many to redraw the definition of humanity, removing many people from the world
community because the awfulness of the conflict is too much for our moral
imaginations." Id. at 130.
11 See infra notes 23-38 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 59-134 and accompanying text.
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Convention to these events as they have transpired since 1994.18 It
will look at the applicability of the genocide convention to the
situation in Rwanda in the context of prevention, looking at
missed opportunities for prevention or mitigation,19 and in the
context of punishment, analyzing the adequacy of the International
War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda as a response to the genocide."
Part VI compares the United Nations' policies toward Rwanda,
established in the shadow of the Genocide Convention, with the
policies of the Allies during the Jewish Holocaust, before the
adoption of the Convention. Finally, Part VII summarizes policy
arguments for an international approach to genocide.22
II. What is Genocide?
"Genocide" has become an emotion-laden term which conjures
up images of the extermination of six million Jews in the
Holocaust by the Nazis during World War II.2 Professor Raphael
Lemkin, a Polish-born Jew, coined the term in his 1944 book Axis
Rule in Occupied Europe by combining the Greek genos, meaning
"race" and the Latin cide meaning "killing" to describe the acts
being committed by the Nazis.24 Although the term "genocide" is
of recent origin the activities the word describes are not new.
18 See infra notes 135-92 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 136-64 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 165-92 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 193-206 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 207-53 and accompanying text.
23 See JOHN P. McKAY ET AL., A HISTORY OF WESTERN SOCIETY 1056 (2d ed.
1983). Hitler's death camps also persecuted, enslaved, or murdered as many as 5.5
million members of other "inferior" groups including gypsies, Slavs, Poles,
homosexuals, the mentally ill, and the infirm. See ALAN S. ROSENBAUM ED., IS THE
HOLOCAUST UNIQUE? PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARATIVE GENOCIDE 2 (1996) [hereinafter Is
THE HOLOCAUST UNIQUE?].
24 See LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION 17-18 (1991).
25 History is punctuated by pogroms against Jews in many countries. See, e.g.,
MCKAY ET AL., supra note 23, at 460-62. Genocide has been aimed at other groups as
well. The slaughter of approximately 1.5 million Armenians by the Turks between 1915
and 1923 has been characterized by some as a prototype of genocide in the twentieth
century. See Robert F. Melson, The Armenian Genocide as Precursor and Prototype of
Twentieth-Century Genocide, in Is THE HOLOCAUST UNIQUE?, supra note 23, at 87-88.
1997]
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Lemkin focused not only on mass killings, but further looked
to the intent and aim of perpetrators attempting to destroy a group:
"The objective of such a plan ... would be disintegration of the
political and social institutions, of culture, language, national
feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups,
and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity,
and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups."26
Lemkin became a sometimes fanatical advocate for the United
Nations adoption of a convention on genocide.27 Though he
worked on the first draft of the convention that was later adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly, the completed work fell
short of Lemkin's goals.2"
The preamble to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, explains the impetus for the
convention: "Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide
has inflicted great losses on humanity; and [b]eing convinced that,
in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge,
international co-operation is required[.] '2 9 Thus, "genocide ... is
a crime under international law which [the contracting parties]
undertake to prevent and punish."3
Some describe the treatment of native groups of North and South America by European
colonizers as genocide. See John McGarry & Brendan O'Leary, The Political
Regulation of National and Ethnic Conflict, 47 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 94, 95 (1994).
More recent victims of genocide include Muslims in Bosnia, the Chinese and indigenous
populations in East Timor, the Bengalis in what is now Bangladesh, and the Kurds in
Iraq. See id. at 95-96.
26 RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944). Lemkin later
extends this definition from national groups to populations. See LEBLANC, supra note
24, at 18.
27 See LEBLANC, supra note 24, at 19.
28 See id. The original draft that incorporated Lemkin's ideas was ultimately
heavily revised to address the various concerns of the many states. See id. Among other
things, the draft was criticized for being too broad, too wide in its application, and, thus,
politically unrealistic. See id. at 27. Specific criticisms focused on the issue of state
sovereignty and concerns that the terms of the Convention be based on legal and moral
principles that would be universally accepted by all member states. See id. The final
version was drafted by an ad hoc committee which included representatives from
Venezuala, the Soviet Union, the United States, Poland, Lebanon, France, and China.
See id. at 28.




The Convention expands Lemkin's definition of genocide,
focusing on the element of intent: "[G]enocide means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such[:]"31
(a) Killing members of a group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
32group.
Beyond criminalizing acts of genocide, Article III of the
convention extends culpability to those who conspire to commit
genocide, incite others publicly to commit genocide, attempt
genocide or are accomplices to the crime.3 Further, private
individuals as well as public officials can be held responsible for
their actions.34
In addition to establishing a framework for the punishment of
genocide as an international crime, the Convention establishes a
mechanism aimed at encouraging prevention of that crime. Article
VIII provides that "Any Contracting Party may call upon the
competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under
the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for
the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the
other acts enumerated in Article HI.,' 35 However, how prevention
or suppression should be undertaken is problematic, since
"appropriate action" can take on many forms including political,
31 Id. art. II.
32 Id.
33 See id. art. III.
34 See id. art. IV. "Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible
rulers, public officials, or private individuals." Id. These persons "shall be tried by a
competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by
such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction ... ." Id. art. VI.
35 Id. art. VIII.
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economic or military action.36
The Convention was adopted unanimously on December 9,
1948 by the United Nations General Assembly, and it had been
ratified by enough countries to become effective in 195 L" The
United States finally ratified the Convention in 1986 and by 1989
a total of 102 parties, including many Western powers, had ratified
it.
38
III. The Jewish Holocaust of World War II
Hitler's rise to power in Germany and aspirations for world
domination were predicated on a philosophy of extreme
nationalism supported by fanatical racism.39 Evidence of his
36 The U.N. Charter empowers the Security Council with decisions regarding the
use of force. See U.N. CHARTER art. 42. The United Nations political structure and the
competing priorities of its member states influence the decision making process.
However, the range of options is spelled out in Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance
of diplomatic relations.
Id. art. 41.
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operation by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.
Id. art. 42.
37 See LEBLANC, supra note 24, at 1.
38 See id. Whether or not to ratify the Convention "became the subject of sporadic,
acrimonious debate for almost forty years" in the United States. Id. When it finally was
ratified, it was subject to the conditions of the Lugar-Helms-Hatch Sovereignty Package.
See id. at 2. The Sovereignty package limited U.S. approval of the Genocide Convention
with a number of reservations and understandings. These understandings include, in
part: a requirement for specific intent, a definition of mental harm limited to permanent
impairment of mental faculties accomplished by specified means, and Senate approval of
U.S. participation in any tribunal punishing genocide. See id. at 253-54.
39 See McKAY ET AL., supra note 23, at 1039-48. Hitler's anti-semitism was based
not on religious principles but on the biological racial theories of the nineteenth century.
See KAGAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 953-54. These theories supplied the foundation for
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ideological bent was evident from an early period, most clearly in
his 1924 autobiography, Mein Kampf, written while he was
imprisoned for plotting against the German govemment.4 Once in
power, Hitler perpetrated a campaign of hatred against Jews and
other "inferior" races within Germany and by 1935 had
successfully taken away all of their civil rights.' In a speech given
in 1939, Hitler articulated his plans for the European Jews,
threatening their survival if war broke out.4
Nevertheless, "until the start of the war, the Nazis gave the
Jews every encouragement to leave Germany, albeit stripped of
Hitler's racist policies, beginning with the work of Arthur de Govineau in Essay on the
Inequality of the Human Races (1853-54), which posited that Western civilization's
problems stemmed from the degeneration of the Aryan race. This theory was
supplemented by Houston Stewart Chamberlain's assertion in 1899 that the Jews were
the particular enemies of the European races. See id. at 859-62.
40 Hilter characterized the Jew as "only and always a parasite in the body of other
peoples." ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 304 (Ralph Manheim trans., Houghton Mifflin
Co. 1943). He continued, "[I]n his vileness he becomes so gigantic that no one need be
surprised if among our people the personification of the devil as the symbol of all evil
assumes the living shape of the Jew." Id. at 324. "If we pass all the causes of the
German collapse in review, the ultimate and most decisive remains the failure to
recognize the racial problem and especially the Jewish menace." Id. at 327. Some would
argue that Hilter capitalized on hatred of the Jews as a means of gaining power. See
generally McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 25 (describing genocide as a political tool).
41 See McKAY ET AL., supra note 23, at 1047. The legislation enacted on
September 15, 1935, entitled Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor
included provisions forbidding marriages or sexual intercourse between Jews and
Germans, prohibiting the employment of German women under age 45 as servants in
Jewish households, and proscribing the display of the German flag by Jews. See KAGAN
ET AL., supra note 9, at 954.
42 See RICHARD L. RUBENSTEIN, THE CUNNING OF HISTORY: THE HOLOCAUST AND
THE AMERICAN FUTURE 11 (1975). Recent declassification of wartime documents
suggests that British intelligence may have had access to information about actual Nazi
executions of Russian Jews as early as September 1941. Alan Cowell, The Holocaust:
What London Knew About Genocide: Files Suggest Code-Breakers had Early
Knowledge About Atrocities in Eastern Europe, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Nov. 19, 1996, at
B 1. However, it has been suggested that the Allied powers could not have acted on this
information. See William J. vanden Heuvel, The Holocaust Was No Secret: But, a New
Book Argues, the Allies Were Right to Focus on Defeating Nazis Rather than Rescuing
Jews; Indeed, They Had No Choice, THE NEWS & OBSERVER, (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 5,
1997, at A21 (reviewing a forthcoming book, THE MYTH OF RESCUE, by William D.
Rubenstein, which suggests that even if the British were aware that genocide was taking
place, the best option available to the Allies to save the Jews was to put an end to the
killing by winning the war as quickly as possible).
1997]
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almost all of their possessions." '4  Unfortunately, Allied
governments made escape difficult if not impossible. The French
foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, expressed the sentiments of
many Western powers when he told the German Foreign Minister
in 1938 that his country "did not want to receive any more Jews
from Germany and [wondered] whether we could not take some
sort of measures to keep them from coming to France."" This
response is understandable in light of the overwhelming burden on
countries created by the influx of large numbers of refugees.
However, these same considerations led the Allies to turn
away from the plight of Hitler's victims even after the war was
underway. The British concern was captured in the words of Lord
Moyne, the British High Commissioner in Egypt. When alerted to
the possibility of rescuing Hungarian Jews bound for
extermination at Auschwitz through a deal with Adolf Eichmann,
Lord Moyne reportedly replied, "What shall I do with those
million Jews? Where shall I put them?"' In fact, Jewish refugees
headed for Palestine were intercepted and forced to return to
Europe by British warships, despite the British government's
knowledge that their return would doom them to extermination."
In addition to their failure to assist escaping Jews, the Allied
governments failed to take definitive steps to intervene or mitigate
Hitler's systematic extermination of Jews and others through the
43 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 42, at 17.
44 Id. at 18 (quoting a letter dated Dec. 9, 1938 from Joachim von Ribbentrop,
German Foreign Minister, to Adolph Hitler). In the 1939 poem Refugee Blues, W.H.
Auden expressed the dilemma of Jews trying to flee Germany:
Thought I heard the thunder rumbling in the sky;
It was Hitler over Europe, saying, "They must die":
0 we were in his mind, my dear, 0 we were in his mind.
Saw a poodle in a jacket fastened with a pin,
Saw a door opened and a cat let in:
But they weren't German Jews, my dear, but they weren't
German Jews.
W.H. AUDEN, Refugee Blues, in W.H. AUDEN: SELECTED POEMS 83, 84 (Edward
Mendelson ed., Vintage Books 1989).
45 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 42, at 17. For a description of the proposed plan and its
outcome, see RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS, VOLUME THREE
1132-40 (1985).
46 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 42, at 19.
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use of concentration camps and gas chambers.47 In 1944, during a
time when the Americans and British were bombing oil refineries
and rubber plants near Auschwitz, the Allies had knowledge of the
atrocities being perpetrated in the concentration camps.4' The
Americans and the British considered but ultimately denied
requests by several Jewish groups to bomb the gas chambers and
railway lines leading to Auschwitz.49 The Americans considered
the request "impracticable" due to the diversion of forces it would
presumably require." The British similarly rejected the request.'
By this point in the war, such action may well have been
ineffective. However, whether or not Allied rescue attempts
were possible or would have been successful, approximately half a
million Jews were exterminated at Auschwitz between May and
47 See id. at 20.
48 See HILBERG, supra note 45, at 1129.
49 See id. at 1129-31.
50 See id. at 1131.
51 See id. at 1130. The following letter, written in 1944 in response to an appeal for
Allied military intervention by Chaim Weizmann, later to become the first president of
Israel, illustrates the reluctance of the international community to act to prevent further
slaughter:
My dear Dr. Weizmann:
You will remember that on the 6th of July you discussed with the Foreign
Secretary the Camp of Birkenau in Upper Silesia, and the atrocities that were
being committed there by Germans against Hungarian and other Jews. You
enquired whether any steps could be taken to put a stop to, or even to mitigate
those massacres, and you suggested that something might be achieved by
bombing the camps and, also, if it was possible, the railway lines leading to
them.
As he promised, Mr. Eden immediately put the proposal to the Secretary of
State for Air. The matter received the most careful consideration of the Air
Staff, but I am sorry to have to tell you that, in view of the very great technical
difficulties involved, we have no option but to refrain from pursuing the
proposal in present circumstances.
I realize that this decision will prove a disappointment for you, but you may
feel fully assured that the matter was most thoroughly investigated.
Yours sincerely,
Richard Law [Minister of State in the Foreign Office]
RUBENSTE1N, supra note 42, at 20.
52 See HILBERG, supra note 45, at 1130. "The most effective rescue is that which is
undertaken before the danger point has been reached." Id. at 1109.
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November 1944 after requests for bombing had been denied. 3
In December 1945, the Allies confronted the Nazis with their
atrocities in the Nuremberg trials. In his opening statement,
Associate U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson of the
International Military Tribunal said: "The wrongs which we seek
to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant and
so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored,
because it cannot survive their being repeated. 54 This comment
reflects the view of the participants in the Nuremberg trials that
this action by the international community would act to deter
future aggressors."
The Jewish Holocaust stands as a paradigm of horror in the
twentieth century. The actions. of the international community in
conducting the Nuremberg trials and adopting the Genocide
Convention speak to our rejection of the act of group annihilation.
If the memory of the Holocaust is the motivator, then it is
important to note the results of one recent poll. 6 French, British
and American citizens were questioned as to whether, in light of
the movement to deny that the Holocaust took place, they believed
that mass murders of Jews took place in the Second World War;
although 94% of French and 84% of Britons polled believed it
had, only 62% of Americans polled believed it. 7  Seventy-nine
percent of French and 73% of Britons disagreed with the notion
that the Holocaust was no longer relevant, while only 63% of
Americans rejected this statement.58
53 See id. at 1132.
54 Bill Powell, Lessons of Nuremberg: Atrocities Have Continued in 50 Years
Since Nazi War Crimes Trial, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 1995, at 52.
55 See id. at 54.
56 See Knowledge of the Holocaust, Soc'y, Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 2. This Louis
Harris-France poll was conducted for the American Jewish Committee and was designed
to gauge the amount of public information about the Holocaust. See id.
57 See id.
58 See id. David Singer, the research director of the American Jewish Committee
that commissioned the poll, attributes these results to American ignorance about the
Holocaust rather than to anti-semitism: While French and foreign Jews were deported
during the German occupation of Europe, many Americans were not first-hand
witnesses to the plight of the Jews, and were thus less aware of the genocide. See id.
However, a book of oral history reveals a troubling indifference toward the Holocaust
[Vol. 22
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IV. The Genocide in Rwanda
A. Rwanda 's Colonial History
The region which now includes the countries of Rwanda and
Burundi began to be colonized by the Germans in 1903. At
approximately the same time, French Roman Catholic
missionaries began to proselytize in the area. 9 The German
colonizers found a country inhabited by three ethnic groups: the
Twa, who were the original inhabitants; the Hutu agriculturists,
who had entered the area between the 4th and 7th centuries A.D.;
and the Tutsi pastoralists, who were the newest inhabitants though
they had been in the region for centuries. In 1919, after
Germany's defeat in the First World War, the colonies were taken
over by Belgium which took a more invasive approach to
61governing.6.
At the time the region was colonized, the Tutsi appear to have
been the more dominant group, despite the greater numbers of
Hutu.62 Although resentment between the groups may have
existed already, the Belgian system of administration exacerbated
tribal tension by increasing Tutsi power and treating them as the
favored group.63 One analyst,, looking at Africa in general, noted
what may also be accurately applied to Rwanda: "[W]hen the
Europeans first came to Africa there were coherent, functioning
among Polish peasants. See CLAUDE LANZMANN, SHOAH: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE
HOLOCAUST (1985). This book and a nine-and-a-half hour film tell the story of the
Holocaust through the narratives not only of survivors, but of witnesses and bureaucrats
who participated in the process.
59 See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY PROFILE: RWANDA/BURUNDI 3
(1993).
60 See id. The Twa are now a small minority. Hutu comprise 85-90% of the
population and Tutsi comprise 9-14% of the population. See id. at 6. The origin of the
Rwandan Tutsi is the subject of debate, but it appears that Tutsi chieftains first
concentrated power in the 15th century. See id. at 3.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See id. Physically, the Tutsi tend to be taller and to have lighter skin and more
aquiline features. See Nancy Gibbs, Why? The Killing Fields of Rwanda, TIME, May 16,
1994, at 57, 61. The Belgians, relying on notions of racial hierarchy, saw the Tutsi as
the superior group in the region and gave them positions of power in the colonial
government, as well as other privileges such as access to education. See id.
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societies of varying degrees of sophistication, some of great
political subtlety and artistic accomplishment, others simple
hunting and gathering communities .... This was destroyed by
colonialism."64
Rwanda gained independence from Belgium in 1962.65 Prior
to this, in 1959, a Hutu uprising against the dominant Tutsi
resulted in hundreds of deaths and approximately 150,000 Tutsi
refugees fleeing the country." The Belgians, responding to
external pressures for democratization within its colonies,
supported the Hutu coup.67 Thus, at the time of independence, the
country was governed by the majority Hutu.6' However, instability
and violence between Hutu and Tutsi in the wake of this political
turnover lasted into 1966.69
61 William Pfaff, A New Colonialism? Europe Must Go Back into Africa, FOREIGN
AFF., Jan./Feb. 1995, at 2, 3-4.
65 See Raymond W. Copson, Rwanda and Burundi: Background and Chronology,
CONG. RES. SERVICE: REP. FOR CONGRESS, Apr. 14, 1994, at 5.
66 See id. During the uprising, some gangs of Hutu attacked Tutsi and cut off their
feet with machetes, literally cutting the generally taller Tutsi "down to size." Gibbs,
supra note 63, at 61.
67 See Gibbs, supra note 63, at 61-62.
68 See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY PROFILE: RWANDA/BURUNDI 4
(1993-1994). This coup brought Mr Kayibanda of the Mouvement democratique
republicain-PARMEHUTU (MDR-PARMEHUTU) into power. See id. In 1973, Major
General Juvenal Habyarimana led a successful coup against Kayibanda's government,
killing him and dissolving the parliament. See id. Habyarimana created the Mouvement
revolutionnaire national pour le developpement party (MRND) in 1975, which
remained the sole political party until 1991, when the president was forced to allow the
creation of new parties. See id. In order to maintain control, the Hum government
capitalized on the racial divisions among the population: A system of racial-identity
cards was instituted and a form of apartheid was considered to isolate the Tutsi in
specified regions. See Gibbs, supra note 63, at 62.
69 See Copson, supra note 65, at 5. A number of massacres of Tutsi occurred
during this volatile period, and again in 1973, Tutsi were targeted for slaughter during a
coup which brought President Habyarimana to power. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE
UNIT, COUNTRY PROFILE: RWANDA/BURUNDI'4 (1995-96). However, it should be noted
that Hutu have been the targets of massacres by Tutsi in the neighboring country of
Burundi since 1972. See id; see also All Things Considered: Long History of Tribal
Tension in Rwanda Continues (NPR radio broadcast, Aug. 8, 1994), available in 1994
WL 8678889 (featuring interviews with Hutu and Tutsi refugees). The leader of the
Tutsi Refugee camp remembered, "[I]n 1959 we had the same thing. In 1964 they
repeat it. In 1973 they tried also to eliminate Tutsi. In 1990 they tried again and in
1994." Id. In general see LEO KUPER, THE PITY OF IT ALL: POLARIZATION OF RACIAL AND
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Although there is evidence that the tension between the Hutu
and Tutsi preexisted Belgian rule, colonial intervention greatly
exacerbated these difficulties and shattered the peace that had
previously been maintained. "Colonialism lasted long enough to
destroy the preexisting social and political institutions, but not
long enough to put anything solid and lasting in their place."7 By
treating the Tutsi as the favored group throughout colonial rule,
and then supporting the Hutu coup prior to granting independence,
the Belgian colonizers heightened ethnic tensions. Ultimately,
they left behind conditions that would eventually produce
genocide.
B. Civil War in 1990
While in exile, the Tutsi who had fled Rwanda in 1959
organized the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and launched an
offensive against the Hutu government beginning in October of
1990.71 This civil war continued until a peace agreement mediated
by the Organization for African Unity (OAU) was reached in
August 1993 in Arusha, Tanzania. 72 The Arusha Peace Agreement
called for the formation of a transitional government, with power-
sharing between the existing government, the RPF, and other
recently formed political parties. This transitional government was
to govern until elections could be held for a democratically elected
government.73 The United Nations established the U.N. Assistance
ETHNIC RELATIONS 170-208 (1977) for a discussion of the history of ethnic violence in
Rwanda and Burundi.
70 Pfaff, supra note 64, at 4.
71 See Copson, supra note 65, at 5.
72 See UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY CoUNCIL; REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ON RWANDA, U.N. Doc. S/26488 (Sept. 24, 1993).
73 See id. The make-up of this agreement is complex due to the number of parties
and political positions represented. See generally ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,
COUNTRY REPORT: 2ND QUARTER 1994 UGANDA/RWANDA/BURUNDI 19 (1994)
[hereinafter EIU 2ND QUARTER 1994]. The president's party, and the sole party up until
1991, was the Mouvement republicain national pour la democratie et le developpement
(MRNDD). See id. This side was also supported by the radical Hum-supremacist party
Coalition pour la defense de la republique (CDR), factions of the Mouvement
democratique republicain (MDR) and Parti liberal (PL), and other minor parties. See id.
It appears President Habyarimana worked to create breakaway factions which could lend
him political support. See id. at 20. On the opposing side, the RPF was joined by the
majority factions of PL and MDR, as well as the Parti chretien democrate (PCD) and the
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Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to assist in implementing this
peace agreement with a mandate to "monitor observance of the
Arusha Peace Agreement of August 4, 1993 between the Republic
of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front and contribute to the
security and assist in implementation of the Agreement, the goal of
which is to move toward transitional government and elections in
October 1995." 4 The force began with 800 troops, with
authorization to eventually increase to 2,500 troops, civilians and
observers.75 Despite the peace agreement and noticeable progress
toward its implementation, resistance to the shift in power was
evident among hard-liners, particularly within the president's
party, the Mouvement republicain national pour la democratie et le
developpement (MRNDD), and the Hutu-supremacist party,
Coalition pour la defense de la republique (CDR). The illegal
radio/television station RTLM, controlled by the CDR, broadcast
propaganda against the Tutsi and the Arusha Accords, with no
documented attempts of government intervention. 6 Further, the
RPF, validated by the concerns of a representative of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), accused the
government of training Hutu refugees for attack."
Progress toward implementation of the peace accords was
repeatedly delayed, and by February 1994 only the transitional
presidency had been established.78  On April 5, 1994, the
UNAMIR mandate was renewed for four months.79
C. Genocidal Acts (April-June 1994)
On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying President Juvenal
Habyarimana of Rwanda and the president of neighboring
Parti sociale democrate (PSD). See id. at 19.
74 UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc. S/872 (Oct. 5, 1993).
71 See id.
76 See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, COUNTRY REPORT: IST QUARTER 1994
UGANDAIRWANDA/BURUNDI 19 (1994) [hereinafter EIU 1 ST QUARTER 1994].
77 See id.
78 See id. at 18. In retrospect, following the events of April 6, it appears that these
delays may have been deliberately orchestrated in order to allow the arming and training
of the Presidential Guard and militias which were to be instrumental in the commission
of genocide. See EIU 2ND QUARTER 1994, supra note 73, at 20.
79 See UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc. S/909 (1993).
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Burundi, who were returning from a peace conference in Tanzania,
crashed, killing both men.0 Within the hour, according to some
reports, the Presidential Guard of Rwanda had begun killing
members of the opposition." Early victims included the Prime
Minister, the President of the Supreme Court, and Rwandan
human rights activists. s2
By the time the RPF gained control of the government two
months later, ending the genocide and instituting a new power
structure, the loss of human life was staggering. On May 31, the
U.N. Secretary-General reported that between 250,000 and
500,000 had been killed. By late August, U.N. estimates reached
one million dead, with some estimates reaching 1.5 million. 3
The massacres were initiated by the Presidential Guard, which
reportedly worked from a list of names to wipe out specific
members of the opposition, both Tutsi and moderate Hutu.
4
However, beginning almost immediately, militias trained and
armed in the preceding months began the indiscriminate massacre
of Tutsi civilians. Within the first week, the Presidential Guard,
together with militia members, had killed approximately 20,000
Tutsi and moderate Hutu 6
The Hutu militias involved in the killings included the
Interhamwe ("those who attack together"), a group of people who
were reportedly organized by the President's party, MRNDD, and
80 See EIU 2ND QUARTER 1994, supra note 73, at 19. The contents of the plane's
black box, if it was recovered, were not released and the identities of those responsible
for the fatal crash have not been discovered. See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,
CoUNTRY REPORT: 3RD QUARTER 1994 29 (1994) [hereinafter EIU 3RD QUARTER 1994].
Though it was widely assumed that the RPF was responsible for the crash, some
diplomats believe the plane could have been downed by Hutu militants opposed to the
peace process. See Copson, supra note 65, at 1.
81 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH AFRICA, GENOCIDE IN RWANDA: APRIL-MAY 1994 3
(1994) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].
82 See id. Victims included thirty local International Committee of the Red Cross
employees and seven Rwandan U.N. Children's Fund workers, among others. See EIU
2ND QUARTER 1994, supra note 73, at 21.
83 See Copson, supra note 65, at 3.
8 See EIU 2ND QUARTER 1994, supra note 73, at 20.
85 Seeid. at21.
86 See Copson, supra note 65, at 1-2.
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the Impuzamugambi ("those who have the same goal"), associated
with the CDR, a group that reportedly advocates Tutsi
extermination." In mid-April, the militias reportedly received
distributions of firearms from authorities within the government.
Although carried out initially by the Presidential Guard and
organized militias, the violence soon spread throughout the
civilian population. Radio stations controlled by the Hutu
broadcasted daily messages urging all Hutu to take part in the
killing of Tutsi.89 The effectiveness of these broadcasts can be
measured by the reported participation of Hutu civilians in the
killings.9"
The character of the violence in Rwanda was particularly
appalling and perhaps difficult for Western cultures to
comprehend. The attackers utilized weapons such as screwdrivers,
machetes and Uzis.91 People in places traditionally regarded as
safe havens, such as churches, hospitals and orphanages were
killed.92
Almost immediately following the outbreak of violence, the
2,500-troop United Nations peacekeeping force, UNAMIR, had its
87 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 81, at 2.
88 See id. at 3.
89 See id. at 2. Between April and June 1994, human rights activists and others
frequently urged the United States to jam these radio broadcasts. See Burkhalter, supra
note 8, at 51. Since these broadcasts served not only to incite civilians to take up arms
against the Tutsi population, but also operated as a means of communication between
the militia and their political leaders, their interruption may well have had a significant
impact on the momentum of the genocide. See id. Though the Defense Department may
have possessed the capacity, it responded that "jamming the broadcasts was technically
and legally impossible." Id. Whether or not the United States had the technical
capability, the Clinton administration failed to act on this option. See id.
90 See Copson, supra note 65, at 3. According to Janet Fleischman, researcher at
Human Rights Watch, propaganda urging soldiers to rape Tutsi women was spread even
before and continued during the genocide: "Hutu militia raped thousands, possibly tens
of thousands, of girls and women, leaving emotional and physical scars and spreading
diseases such as AIDS." All Things Considered. Human Rights Report Details Aspect of
Rwandan Genocide (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 6, 1996), available in 1996 WL
12726722.
91 See Gibbs, supra note 63, at 59.
92 See id. at 58-59.
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mandate suspended.93 After requested reinforcements were not
authorized, Belgium withdrew its troops on April 15, followed
shortly by most of the remaining force.94 The U.N. Security
Council rejected the option of a substantial intervention in April
because its members were unwilling to provide troops for the
mission. In the end, United Nations efforts were targeted
primarily at attempting to broker a cease-fire between the newly
warring factions,96 but not at adequately addressing the question
raised by the genocidal killings. Troops did help protect some
civilians, but they did not organize widespread efforts or evacuate
civilians.97
Individual Western powers quickly moved to evacuate their
own citizens from the country-however, Rwandans were not
included in these efforts. 98 In some cases, even Rwandan
employees of foreign embassies were left behind.99
Eventually, France would offer the most comprehensive
attempt to intervene for the protection of civilians through
Operation Turquoise, launched in late June.'0° However, this
intervention was itself highly problematic, in that France had been
a strong supporter of President Habyarimana in the past.10' The
RPF, which was continuing to make progress in its military
93 See EIU 2ND QUARTER 1994, supra note 73, at 24.
94 See id. Ten Belgian peacekeepers attempted to protect Prime Minister
Uwilingiyimana, one of the early targets of the Presidential Guard. Three Belgians were
killed, along with the Prime Minister, and the other seven were then tortured and
murdered by the mob after they had laid down their arms in an attempt to appear
nonthreatening. See Burkhalter, supra note 8, at 46.
95 See EIU 2ND QUARTER 1994, supra note 73, at 24.
96 See id. at 25.
97 See id. at 24. General Dallaire of UNAMIR reportedly said that his forces could
have stopped the genocide with additional equipment and an expanded mandate. See
Burkhalter, supra note 8, at 47. Instead, the withdrawal of troops left Tutsi who had
sought refuge throughout the country in churches, schools and other sanctuaries at the
mercy of the militias. See id.
98 See Gibbs, supra note 63, at 58.
99 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 81, at 11.
100 See EIU 3RD QUARTER 1994, supra note 80, at 26.
"I See id. at 25-26. Since the President's party MRNDD is francophone and the
RPF, coming from Uganda, is anglophone, French foreign policy favored protection of
the status quo. See id.
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campaigns, had previously been suspicious of the French.' 2
Ultimately, however, Operation Turquoise successfully protected
the Tutsi population in western Rwanda, where over 60,000 Tutsi
had already been killed. 3
On July 19, the victorious RPF established a new government
in Kigali, committed to the Arusha Peace Agreement.' °4 The
choice of Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, as president was meant, in
part, to demonstrate the new government's commitment to
national reconciliation. '05  Spokesmen also stressed the
government's intention to prosecute those guilty of perpetrating
the massacres."'
D. Subsequent Refugee Crisis
The genocide, combined with the RPF campaign against the
government, led to the exodus of both Tutsi and Hutu refugees.' 7
After the RPF's victory and grasp of power, a massive exodus of
refugees began, as Hutu fled fearing reprisal attacks.' s Refugee
camps developed along the Rwandan borders in Tanzania, Burundi
and Zaire.'0 9 By far, most refugees fled to camps near Goma,
Zaire, leading to overwhelming humanitarian difficulties."' Food
and water shortages and the spread of disease combined to create
102 See EIU 2ND QUARTER 1994, supra note 73, at 25-26. During peace
negotiations in 1993, the RPF had demanded that French troops leave Kigali and that
they not be part of UNAMIR. See EIU 1ST QUARTER 1994, supra note 76, at 18. Later,
after the outbreak of ethnic violence in April, the RPF accused France of colluding with
the representative of Rwanda on the Security Council to keep "genocide" out of U.N.
resolutions. See EIU 2ND QUARTER 1994, supra note 73, at 26.
103 See EIU 3RD QUARTER 1994, supra note 80, at 27-28. Conversely, however, the
French intervention served to end any other United Nations initiatives to intervene. See
id. Further, the safe-zones set up to protect besieged Tutsi also served to offer rest and
protection for government forces engaging in the genocide. See id.
104 See id. at 25.
105 See id. However, Paul Kagame, the former general of the RPF, is the real
commander of the new government in the role of Vice President and Defense Minister.
See Nancy Gibbs, Can the Strongman Make Peace?, TIME, Aug. 8, 1994, at 41.
106 See EIU 3RD QUARTER 1994, supra note 80, at 25.
107 See Gibbs, supra note 63, at 59-60.
108 See Olojede, supra note 2, at A16.





Apart from these humanitarian problems, the presence of
refugees raised other concerns. Along with the civilian Hutu
population, many of the perpetrators of the genocide took refuge in
the camps.' Former government soldiers and militias were able
to regroup and pose military and political threats on two fronts: In
Rwanda and among the Rwandan refugees, the groups continued
to exert their influence;" 3 in Zaire, they exacerbated and ultimately
contributed to the escalation of existing local ethnic tensions.'
4
The camps, located near the Rwandan border, served as
launching points for both organized attacks and guerrilla forays
back into Rwanda."5  These sorties in effect continued the
genocidal mission of the perpetrators, albeit on a much smaller
scale. "6 The attacks also successfully eliminated witnesses who
may have been able to testify against the perpetrators. "' The
attacks were often carried out with the complicity of Hutu family
and friends who remained in Rwanda, and though many incidents
may have been continuations of the genocide or directed at
destabilizing the new government, human-rights workers viewed
many as aimed at sabotaging the trials: close to 40 potential
witnesses were reported murdered in June alone."'
Furthermore, the threats of the militias and other militants
served to keep ordinary Hutu civilian refugees from returning to
III See id.
112 See Tim Zimmerman, Awaiting a New Spark: Genocide and Civil War Stalk
Bloodied Burundi and Rwanda-Again, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 15, 1996, at
46.
113 See id.
114 See Andrew Purvis, A Contagion of Genocide: The Civil Wars of Rwanda and
Burundi Spread to Eastern Zaire, in a Bloody Conflict the World Ignores, TIME, July 8,
1996, at 38-39.
"5 All Things Considered: Humanitarian Aid Crisis in Zaire Grows (NPR radio
broadcast, Oct. 28, 1996), available in 1996 WL 12727023.
116 See Andrew Purvis, Dead Witnesses Tell No Tales: Rwandan Genocide
Survivors Are the Latest Targets of Hutu Killer Gangs, TIME INT'L, Sept. 23, 1996, at
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Rwanda by spreading fear of Tutsi reprisals.119 As a result
UJNHCR called for the removal from the camps of Hutu who
intimidated refugees or were possible perpetrators of the
genocide.2 ° The new Rwandan president asserted: "Let the
international community remove this factor and 95 percent of
people would return . . . . The philosophy of genocide is still
rampant in the refugee camps." '' In fact, as refugees finally began
returning to Rwanda in November 1996, "[m]any of the refugees
said they would have returned home even earlier had they not been
forced to stay by the Hutu militia that had controlled the camps by
terror tactics since 1994. ' '022
In Zaire, a similar ethnic mix has led to a history of internal
conflict.2 2 Eventually, the fighting in Zaire between rebel Tutsi
and the government army motivated Rwandan Hutu refugees to
return home. 24  Evidence suggests, however, that the Hutu
refugees' presence to some degree led to the escalated tension that
ended in the Zairian Tutsi rebellion. 125
Zaire's ethnic Tutsi, who have been in the eastern part of the
country for more than 200 years, are known as the
Banyamulenge. 2 6 The group achieved economic success in a poor
region, leading to resentment among other ethnic groups. 127 Since
the 1980s, politicians from these other groups have called for the
denial of Zairian citizenship to the Banyamulenge, ultimately
leading to sporadic violence several years ago. '28 However, in
1994, when nearly one million Rwandan Hutu fled to refugee
119 See Zimmerman, supra note 112, at 46.
120 See Christian Jennings, Rwanda says "Intimidators" Block Refugee Return,
REUTER NEWS SERVICE-AFR., Sept. 10, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Reuwld File.
121 Id.
122 Olojede, supra note 2, at 16A.
123 See Fedarko, supra note 5, at 46.
124 See Olojede, supra note 2, at IA, 16A.
125 See Morning Edition: Fighting Forces Hutu to Flee (NPR radio broadcast, Oct.
24, 1996), available in 1996 WL 12730299.
126 See Fedarko, supra note 5, at 46.




camps in Zaire, the violence escalated, fueled by the participation
of the new Hutu refugees. 129 Hutu who carried out the massacre of
Rwanda's Tutsi were able to continue their campaign of genocide,
this time against the Zairian Banyamulenge, unhindered by the
Zairian authorities. 130 According to human rights workers, the
Hutu pillaged Tutsi villages, raping Tutsi women and stealing
cattle. 3' The government may even have been complicit in the
attacks, by helping the Hutu militias with training and arms.132
Eventually, in September of 1996, South Kivu province's
deputy governor ordered the Banyamulenge "foreigners" to leave
Zaire within six days.'33 The rebel Tutsi groups responded with
intensified fighting that ultimately would win them substantial
gains and trigger the exodus of the Rwandan refugees from
Zaire. 1
34
V. Applicability of the Genocide Convention
The Genocide Convention provides "that genocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law which [the Contracting Parties] undertake to
prevent and to punish."'35 Under the Convention, the international
community has two obligations: to attempt to prevent or suppress
genocide and to attempt to punish those responsible once genocide
has been committed. In Rwanda, the actions of the international
community on April 6 and thereafter must be evaluated in light of
the stated goal of preventing genocide. The adequacy of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda can be measured against the





133 See Fedarko, supra note 5, at 46.
134 See Olojede, supra note 2, at Al. It is also important to note that the ethnic
tensions that led both to the genocide in Rwanda and the civil war in Zaire are also
present and volatile in Burundi. In July 1996, after the murders of close to 340 Tutsi by
Hutu rivals, Major Pierre Buyoya seized power and raised fears of violence akin to the
events in Rwanda. See Burundi Hit with Sanctions, MACLEAN'S, Aug. 12, 1996, at 29.
135 Genocide Convention, supra note 7, art. I.
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A. Prevention
The 1948 Genocide Convention provides a mandate for the
intervention of the United Nations "for the prevention and
suppression of acts of genocide.', 3 6 Thus, it has been observed
that "once a determination was reached by a U.N. body that
genocides as opposed to other human rights violations had been
committed, there would be overwhelming public demand ... for
action to be taken.'
137
Whether or not such a public response would have occurred,
officials seemed to fear the possibility.'3 8 The U.N. Security
Council avoided the possibility of this demand by effectively
avoiding a determination of genocide in Rwanda. In its April 30
"Condemnation of all breaches of international humanitarian law
... in Rwanda," the Security Council placed the onus for ending
the slaughter of civilians on the warring parties themselves:
The Security Council demands the interim Government of
Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front take effective
measures to prevent any attacks on civilians in areas under their
control. It calls on the leadership of both parties to condemn
publicly such attacks and to commit themselves to ensuring that
persons who instigate or participate in such attacks are
prosecuted and punished. 1
39
Thus, the Council called upon the interim government, formed
by the actual perpetrators of the genocide, and the RPF, comprised
of Tutsi who were the targets of the genocide, to prevent and
punish the attacks. In effect, the Security Council was "acting as
though both sides were equally guilty for the violence against
136 Id. art. VIII.
13' All Things Considered: Defining Genocide May Not Be Easy: Noah Adams
Interviews Hurst Hannum of Tufts University About Genocide and Its Definition. (NPR
radio broadcast, June 2, 1994), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File.
138 See id. United States officials were careful not to use the word "genocide." See
Burkhalter, supra note 8, at 47. Finally, in mid-June 1994 after an onslaught of
criticism from the Congress and the press, Secretary of State Warren Christopher
adopted the term. See id.
139 UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL; CONDEMNATION OF ALL BREACHES OF
INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW AND REITERATION OF DEMAND FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE,
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1994/21 (Apr. 30, 1994); see also supra note 102 (suggesting the
term genocide was purposefully avoided by the Security Council).
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civilians."' 4  By substituting such words as "human rights
violations" for the emotional term "genocide," the obligation to
intervene was avoided. 4' The decision to use force is enormously
complex, involving multinational cooperation with no guarantee of
success.12 However, given the unique circumstances in Rwanda,
military intervention was appropriate and may well have been
effective. 43  The United Nation's failure to intervene resulted in
grave ramifications.
The most tragic cost can be counted in lives lost: "Early
intervention.., could have saved tens of thousands of... [Tutsi]
... who were huddled in churches, schools, and stadiums before
being killed."'" The United Nations might have chosen to set up
safe zones to protect the Tutsi, "without incurring serious risk to
soldiers on the ground. The militias who carried out most of the
killing did not have the means or the inclination to engage a well-
supported military force." 45 Such an effort might ultimately have
cost less in dollars than the subsequent support sent to refugee
camps after the genocide. '4' Instead, months after the genocide
erupted, close to a million people had been killed.
147
The eventual cost both in dollars and human suffering created
by the refugee camps may also have been avoided had the United
Nations intervened sooner.' Instead, 1.7 million Hutu eventually
fled their homes, taking refuge in camps in three neighboring
countries. 49 Humanitarian relief to serve these camps throughout
'o Destexhe, supra note 9, at 9.
141 See Defining Genocide, supra note 137.
142 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing the power of the Security
Council).
143 See supra note 97 (recounting the assessment of potential intervention by the
General of UNAMIR).
144 Destexhe, supra note 9, at 9.
'45 Andrew Purvis, Looking Back with Hope: Time's Departing Correspondent
Explains Why the Continent's Fate Must be Everyone's Concern, TIME INT'L, Oct. 28,
1996, at 34, available in 1996 WL 12731945.
'46 See id.
147 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
148 See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
149 See Zimmerman, supra note 112, at 46.
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Central Africa was estimated to cost around two million dollars a
day by April 1996.15 In Zaire, these refugees suffered from a lack
of food, clean water, and medicine. 5' Their plight was made even
worse by many Hutu militia members who continued to intimidate
the other refugees and to launch forays into Rwanda, hazarding a
re-ignition of civil war.'52
The activities of these militants ultimately risked the
inflammation of regional hostilities.'53 The presence of refugees in
Burundi and Zaire, where similar ethnic tensions lurk, created the
danger of a full-scale regional war. In Zaire, the refugees were
participants in the beginnings of a civil war there.
54
Prevention was possible, in part, since UNAMIR was present
at the time the violence erupted. However, the presence of
personnel in Rwanda may also have given the United Nations the
opportunity to anticipate the impending genocide. The history of
ethnic conflicts and massacres of Tutsi in Rwanda, evidence of
militias being trained and arms being shipped prior to violence,
and the resistance of the hard-liners in the Hutu government to the
peace agreement were all signs of the possibility of forthcoming
violence. "
The United States, as the lone superpower on the Security
Council, held great sway over the decisionmaking process. In
particular, specific actions of the United States delayed or blocked
efforts to intervene earlier to prevent or suppress the genocide. 156
The United States supported the Complete pull out of UNAMIR
right after violence erupted.'57 Shortly thereafter, in May 1994,
President Clinton issued a Presidential Directive limiting U.S.
involvement in U.N. peacekeeping, reducing contributions to
150 See id.
151 See Fedarko, supra note 5, at 47.
152 See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
154 See id.
155 Sie supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
156 See Destexhe, supra note 9, at 10. U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali urged humanitarian intervention-the use of force to end the killings-but could
not gather support from the Council. See Burkhalter, supra note 8, at 49.
157 See Burkhalter, supra note 8, at 47.
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peacekeeping operations and stressing that American troops would
not be involved unless national security had been directly
threatened. 158 This Directive provided the justification for U.S.
opposition to an expanded U.N. mission in Rwanda. 59 Also, in
May, the United States opposed a resolution that might have
allowed U.N. troops to protect both refugees and aid workers
throughout the country. 6 The resolution that was finally passed
did not include a mandate to use force in combatting the
massacres. 161  U.S. stipulations then delayed deployment of
additional U.N. troops after the mandate was finally issued.62
The failure to intervene earlier ultimately made it more
difficult to punish the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide.
First, the scale of the killings themselves, just during the period
from April to June 1994, makes the likelihood of bringing the
guilty to justice logistically impracticable. Yet even after the RPF
won the war and took control of the Rwandan government, Hutu
insurgents in the camps continued the genocide. 63  While
deplorable in their own right, the continued killings had the
additional effect of decreasing the likelihood of successful
158 See Destexhe, supra note 9, at 10. The shocking deaths of U.S. soldiers during
the intervention in Somalia led the Clinton administration to rethink its willingness to
participate in foreign crises. See id. Ultimately, this led to the Presidential Decision
Directive on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, which severely limited the
possibility of intervention in Rwanda. See id. Although this Directive was announced
in the middle of the Rwandan crisis, the administration had been considering it for
nearly a year. See Burkhalter, supra note 8, at 48.
'19 See id. at 49.
160 See Destexhe, supra note 9, at 10.
161 See id. Agreement on the mission was delayed from May 2 to May 17 because
of U.S. disagreement with the Secretary-General's proposal. See Burkhalter, supra note
8, at 49-51. Boutros-Ghali's plan provided for a mandate "to obtain a cease-fire, open
the airport, and support humanitarian assistance and displaced populations." Id. at 50.
The United States balked at even this narrow mandate, proposing, instead, that troops be
positioned to assist refugees along the borders of Rwanda, instead of in Kigali, where
much of the killing was concentrated. See id. Thus, the plan ultimately approved on
May 17 was a compromise. See id.
162 See Burkhalter, supra note 8, at 50. The U.S. equipment, fifty armored
personnel carriers (APCs) requested by the United Nations to implement the approved
plan, was not completely delivered until June 25. See id. The United Nations finally
moved the APCs into Kigali during the first week of August. See id.
163 See Purvis, supra note 116, at 35.
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prosecutions of the perpetrators: While some witnesses were
actually murdered, others feared for their lives if they continued to
cooperate with the process.
B. Punishment
Rwanda's Justice Minister opened the first public session of
the U.N. Tribunal for Rwanda by saying: "It is the responsibility
of humanity as a whole to avenge those who perished in this
Rwandan tragedy."'65  The words were reminiscent of opening
statements made fifty years earlier in December 1945 when the
International Military Tribunal, later known as the Nuremberg
war-crimes trial, began.'" In that trial, twenty-two alleged Nazi
war criminals were tried, and ultimately all but three were
convicted. 67 More than 5,000 Nazis would be convicted in later
trials. 68 The Nuremberg trial may have been successful in part
because it represented "victor's justice," bolstered by tremendous
international support. 69  The future success of the Rwandan
tribunal may be more dubious.
The U.N. authorization to punish perpetrators of genocide is
outlined in the 1948 Convention: "Persons committing genocide
or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished,
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
officials, or private individuals."'70 These persons "shall be tried
by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the
act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may
have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which
shall have accepted its jurisdiction."''
164 See id.
165 Andrew Kelly, Rwanda Genocide Tribunal Opens With Global Appeal, REUTER
WORLD SERVICE, June 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
'6 See Powell, supra note 54, at 52.
167 See id. at 54.
168 See id.
169 Id.
170 Genocide Convention, supra note 7, art. IV.
171 Id. art. VI. There is increasing support for a permanent International Criminal
Court to prosecute violations of international humanitarian law. See generally David
Stoelting, The Proposed Int'l Criminal Court, 216 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1996). Such a court
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In establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, the
Security Council expressed its concern about reports of genocide
and "other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of
international humanitarian law." 172 As these violations represented
"a threat to international peace and security," the Council
"determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective
measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for
them."'73  It further noted that the prosecution of the persons
responsible "would contribute to the process of national
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace." 174
The resolution stated that the Council believed "the
establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of
persons responsible for genocide and the other above-mentioned
violations of international humanitarian law [would] contribute to
ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively redressed..
S.,,17 Bolstering this optimism, the U.N. legal chief Hans Corell
said that the Tribunal would be "a powerful signal that genocide
and other crimes against humanity can no longer be tolerated and
that the same law applies whether in central Europe or in
Africa., 76
The optimism and sweeping aspirations expressed by the
United Nations in the creation of the Tribunal for Rwanda belies
the rather limited objectives of the tribunal itself. The scope of the
statute is limited to "violations ... committed in the territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for [genocide and
would eliminate the need for ad hoc tribunals. See id. However, some critics note that
the proposed court could suffer from severe limitations. See John M. Goshko, U.N.
Moving Toward Creation of Criminal Court; But Advocates Fear Severe Limits, Backed
by U.S., Will Be Imposed on Its Independence, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1996, at A27. An
international conference will be convened to review the Draft Statute for an International
Court which is contained in a report prepared by the International Law Commission. See
id.; Report of the Int'l Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 140, at
3, U.N. Doc. A/49/355 (1994).
172 UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COUNCIL; ESTABLISHMENT AND STATUTE OF INT'L





176 Kelly, supra note 165.
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other] such violations committed in the territory of neighboring
States" and is further limited to violations committed "between 1
January 1994 and 31 December 1994."''
Rwanda would have preferred to include cases dating back to
1990, which would encompass massacres that took place between
1990 and 1993 at Kibilira, Bigogwe, and Bugesera.'78 Avocats sans
Frontieres (Lawyers without Frontiers), a Brussels-based group
established in 1991, has also expressed concern over the limits of
the Tribunal: "There is much evidence that the planning of the
Rwandan genocide took place before 1994 .... For example,
those responsible for transport, financing and delivery of arms, and
those responsible for inciting the population should also be held
responsible."'79
A further point of contention is the fact that the International
Tribunal for Rwanda has the power to overrule Rwandan judicial
decisions."' The statute provides that "the International Tribunal
for Rwanda shall have primacy over the national courts of all
States. At any stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal for
Rwanda may formally request national courts to defer to its
,,181
competence ....
Finally, "the penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be
limited to imprisonment. 1 12 Directly in opposition with Rwanda's
desires, the death penalty would not be available.
3
The Tribunal was established at the request of the Government
of Rwanda "for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons
responsible for genocide and other serious violations of
177 RWANDAN TRIBUNAL, supra note 172, art. 1.
178 See Cabinet Discusses Differences with the U.N. over Tribunal, REUTERS
TEXTLiNE, BBC MONITORING SERVICE, Nov. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allnws File [hereinafter Cabinet Discusses Differences].
179 See Lawyers Urge Wider Mandate for Rwanda Tribunal, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE,
June 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuna File.
180 See Cabinet Discusses Differences, supra note 178.
181 RWANDAN TRIBUNAL, supra note 172, art. 8.
182 Id. art. 23.




international humanitarian law.' 84  In the end, however, Rwanda
voted against the Tribunal."5 In a statement concerning the
Tribunal, former U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright said: "We
regret that the Government of Rwanda cast its vote against the
resolution . . . . While we understand their concerns regarding
several key issues--indeed, on the death penalty we might even
agree-it was simply not possible to meet those concerns and still
maintain broad support on the Council.' 8 6 Though unhappy with
the provisions for the Tribunal noted above, the Rwandan
government agreed to cooperate.
87
The Tribunal's work is also riddled with external difficulties:
"It has suffered from a lack of funding, a shortage of criminal
investigators, and poor co-operation from countries where suspects
have sought refuge.' 8 8  Further, because so many have been
arrested, the suspects are suffering in overcrowded jails. 9 The
first indictments, announced on December 12, 1995, included only
eight people.' These people, though not among those who
organized the genocide, are local leaders charged with the
slaughter of tens of thousands."'
The mission of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, like that
of the Nuremberg trials, reveals the symbolic and actual
importance of punishing the guilty. Unfortunately, the failure to
exact retribution will further impair the goal of deterrence.
184 RWANDAN TRIBUNAL, supra note 172, art. 1.
185 See id.
186 U.N. Security Council Establishes Int 7 Tribunal for Rwanda, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE DISPATCH, Nov. 21, 1994, at 780.
187 Judging War Criminals, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 14, 1994, at B6.
188 David Orr, U.N. Tribunal Begins Rwanda Genocide Trial, THE INDEPENDENT,
May 31, 1996, at 12, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
189 See id.
"I See All Things Considered. Int'l Tribunal in Rwanda Issues Indictments (NPR
radio broadcast, Dec. 12, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File.
191 See id.; see also Paul Lewis, UN. Report Comes Down Hard on Rwandan
Genocide Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL-NYT
9704402803. A United Nations report evaluating the Tribunal found that it "suffers
from chaotic management and widespread financial abuses, is paralyzed by bureaucratic
infighting, lacks qualified staff and has been handicapped by weak support from the
United Nations headquarters in New York." Id.
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Anticipating the danger of this failure, Rwandan lawyer Frederic
Mutagwera warns:
We are in the process of falling into the trap that these
murderers have set for us .... This genocide is distinguished
by the fact that a maximum number of people have been
mplicated in the killings--there is talk of a million killers ....
The Hutu extremists estimated that no court in the world could
judge that many criminals, and they bet that they were going to
get off. Are we going to say that they're right?'92
VI. Similarities Between the Jewish Holocaust and Rwanda
The Jewish Holocaust happened before the adoption of the
U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.' 93 By contrast, the genocide in Rwanda was allowed
to happen notwithstanding the provisions of the Genocide
Convention. However, a comparison reveals more similarities
than might be expected. What does this say for the effectiveness
of the Convention or for the international community's
commitment to the rights of minorities and other potential victims
of genocide?
The foregoing discussion has outlined the significant facts of
the attempted extermination of the Jews by the Nazis during
World War I1194 and the attempted annihilation of the Tutsi by their
Hutu compatriots in 1994.95 These two episodes illustrate the
tremendous destructive power inherent in the crime of genocide.
Between 1939 and 1945, the Nazis succeeded in wiping out one-
third of the world's Jewish population, and nearly eliminated the
European Jewish population.96 By July of 1994, more than half of
the Tutsi population in Rwanda had been killed. 97 Thus, the
192 Laurent Bijard, Can Justice Be Done? Massacred: 1,000,000; Tried: 0, WORLD
PRESS REv., June 1996, at 7.
193 See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of the
Genocide Convention).
"I See supra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 80-106 and accompanying text (outlining the events of the
Rwandan genocide).
196 See HILBERG, supra note 45, at 1047-48.




relative impact of such targeted destruction on a discrete
population can be more devastating than a mere body count may
reveal. The following comparison notes how little the opportunity
for prevention has improved since the adoption of the Genocide
Convention.
As early as 1924, Hitler had exposed his extreme racist views
in an autobiography. In addition, the Allies had uncovered
evidence of the atrocities being committed in the Nazi
concentration camps well before the liberation of those camps. 9'
Although they may have been aware of the violence against Jews
and others, and despite the history of genocidal events prior to
World War HI,' 99 the Allies may have been unable to comprehend
the magnitude of the crimes that were being committed. At the
time, the Allies simply made a series of discrete decisions, the
ramifications of which can only be recognized in hindsight.
However, after the Holocaust, the Nuremberg trials, and the
adoption of the Genocide Convention, knowledge of what could
happen should motivate the international community to take action
when faced with similar atrocities. °° The history of ethnic
conflicts between the Hutu and Tutsi in Central Africa, and in
particular the knowledge of Tutsi massacres in the recent past,
coupled with the hard-liner resistance to the Arusha Accords,
should have given some advanced warning that genocide was
probable.2"'
With respect to either World War II or Rwanda, even if
foreknowledge of the genocide was not possible, once it
commenced, action could have been taken to save lives. However,
in both instances, such action was not taken. As described above,
there was great ambivalence among the Allies, in particular the
198 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (describing Hitler's early
activities and Allied intelligence about the plight of the Jews).
1' See supra note 25.
200 Although reaching consensus among the Security Council members requires
compromise, the decisive action taken in the Persian Gulf when Iraq invaded Kuwait in
1991 is an example of the Council's power to effectively intervene when motivated.
201 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing past conflicts); supra
note 76 and accompanying text (discussing hard-liner resistance).
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British, to admitting Jewish refugees.2"2 Similarly, despite the fact
that troops were able to evacuate foreign nationals from Rwanda
quickly and efficiently, no effort was made to conduct endangered
Rwandans to safety.2"3 Thus, Rwandans, seeking refuge within the
country in churches and schools, were at the mercy of the armed
militias.2°4
Finally, in both the Jewish and Rwandan genocides, the
international community was slow to take action to end or even to
mitigate the killing. Despite evidence of the atrocities being
committed in the Nazi concentration camps, Allied governments
rejected proposals to bomb either the camps or access routes to
them, even though such bombings might have saved hundreds of
thousands of lives.2"5  At the time, of course, the Allied
governments were engaged in a world war. In Rwanda, however,
such countervailing considerations were not present. International
troops were actually in place, but the United Nations decided to
pull out UNAMIR at a time when a build up or other
reinforcement could have saved civilian lives.2 6
This comparison is outlined here to highlight the poor progress
made in combating genocide during the last fifty years. Although
the international community has not yet learned to prevent or
otherwise deal with genocide, there are compelling reasons to
work toward improvement. The following section examines the
phenomenon of genocide, its potential causes, and the case for
strengthening international responsibility for prevention and
punishment.
VII. Policy Arguments for an International Approach to
Genocide
The international community has both the moral duty and the
legal power to attempt to prevent and punish the crime of
202 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text; see also supra note 145 and
accompanying text (noting the potential efficacy of safe havens).
204 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
205 See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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genocide." 7 Analysts have suggested that it is possible to identify
particular contexts in which genocide is likely to occur, thus
providing the opportunity to intervene before widespread
destruction takes place. As these dangerous political contexts are
increasingly prevalent, the United Nations and its members should
work to identify and implement appropriate programs of
prevention in response to these cues. Recently, the United Nations
has confined itself to providing humanitarian aid in the wake of
disasters and, at least in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to
meting out punishment for human rights violations. The
inadequacy of these approaches suggests that the time has come to
seriously consider more proactive intervention strategies.
Exactly what form these intervention strategies should take is a
matter for debate. The first step is to recognize that since the
community of nations has ratified a convention declaring genocide
to be intolerable, the United Nations has an obligation to fulfill
this pledge. Ultimately, this will require a case-by-case evaluation
of options in each situation where genocidal events are occurring.
Genocide is a unique crime in that it imposes a moral duty on
humanity as a whole to respond.2 8 This duty primarily arises from
the observation that "[t]he elimination of any group that is
representative of the human race must affect the whole human
race." 29  Beyond this, there are also pragmatic reasons for an
international response. The regulation and prevention of genocide
cannot be entrusted to governments at a national level since "by its
very nature, the author of the crime is the state, or powerful groups
who have the backing of the state. '2" Thus, if help is to be
207 See Genocide Convention, supra note 7.
208 See Destexhe, supra note 9, at 3.
209 Id. at 4.
210 Destexhe, supra note 9, at 4 (quoting Raphael Lemkin). Theologians and others
have struggled with the meaning of the Holocaust. One particularly troubling question
has to do with the power of moral arguments in a secular society. See RUBENSTEIN,
supra note 42, at 91. In a secular society, the state steps into the role of a god, wielding
the sole power to define right and wrong, what will be rewarded, and what will be
punished. See id. In such a case, the state can only be limited by "the laws of men acting
in concert, at best a tenuous guarantee of a humane society." Id. Similarly, the
enforcement of human rights within the state is troublesome: "[I]n the face of new forms
of domination, assertions about innate human dignity are either false or meaningless."
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forthcoming at all, international attention and action will be
crucial.
In many cases, including Rwanda, there is a further source of
moral responsibility, particularly on Western powers: Political
upheaval may be a direct result of former colonial intervention. In
fact, "[f]rom the colonial period to the Cold War, the West has
been engaged in Africa, often with damaging results. Now, faced
with the opportunity to bring change for the better, it should not
turn its back." '' As conflict and political instability continue on
the African continent, Western countries must act to keep the
problems from getting worse."'
The Genocide Convention, explained in detail above, is the
legal foundation upon which the United Nations and its member
states can seek to prevent and suppress genocide and to punish the
perpetrators of genocidal acts."' If genocide can be identified or
predicted,; members of the Security Council have the power
together to intervene.214
Although the Genocide Convention does not distinguish
between different types of genocide, instead focusing on the
common elements of the crime, in order to formulate appropriate
preventative actions, it is important to recognize that genocide
arises in different contexts.2"5 Leo Kuper, in his book The
Prevention of Genocide, identifies the following four types of
genocide:
1. Genocide against indigenous peoples;
216
2. Genocide against hostage groups;217
Id. at 92. Might we look to an international definition of rights to protect the individual
from the state?
211 Purvis, supra note 145.
212 See Pfaff, supra note 64, at 5.
213 See supra notes 29-35.
214 See supra note 36 for a description of the Security Council's powers.
215 See LEO KUPER, THE PREVENTION OFGENOCIDE 150 (1985).
216 Id. at 151. Examples of this type of genocide include the treatment of Native
Americans by the colonizers of the Americas, or the Aboriginal peoples in Australia.
See id.
217 Id. at 152. This type of genocide targets "vulnerable minorities who serve as
hostages to the fortunes of the dominant groups in the state." Id. For example, the Jews
and Gypsies in Nazi Germany served this role. See id.
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3. Genocide following upon decolonization of a two-tier
structure of domination;
218
4. Genocide in the process of struggles by ethnic or racial or
religious groups, for power or secession, greater autonomy
219
or more equality.
The last two categories have particular significance for the
international community in the late twentieth century. Recent
events illustrate both the danger and pervasiveness of these
different political contexts. Decolonization in Africa has led to
significant political upheaval on that continent.220 In addition, the
end of the Cold War has ushered in a period of transformation for
many other areas of the globe. 22'
If it is possible to identify these difficult political situations,
then it should be possible to act upon them. Ideally, prevention
would consist of early efforts to reconcile the divisions of differing
groups: "[M]any of the conditions that might encourage .
genocide could be eliminated . . . by the abolition of inequality
between groups and their full incorporation into the political and
other institutions of the society.' 22
218 Id. at 153. Kuper identifies the political climates of Rwanda and Burundi as
classic examples of this phenomenon. See id. To illustrate the instability of this
political context, he cites the massacres in Rwanda in the early 1960s: "Between 10,000
and 12,000 Tutsi were murdered in a sequence of events clearly predictable in their
general course, if not in their specific detail." Id. at 154.
219 Id. at 155. This form suggests that genocide can serve as a type of political
regulation. See McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 25, at 94. "Genocides are intended to
terminate national and ethnic conflict, and they often succeed in securing the relevant
territories for imperial rulers." Id. at 96. However, genocide as a political tool also has
the counterproductive effect of creating "explosive and historically entrenched bitterness
and fear amongst the descendants of victims." Id.
220 See generally Purvis, supra note 145 (citing problems in Rwanda, Liberia,
Burundi and Somalia). However, those wars have devastated only a small portion of the
continent. Other regions have experienced positive political, economic and social
progress, including South Africa, Uganda, and Ethiopia. See id.
221 "National and ethnic conflict has been a persistent feature of modernity but the
last few years have brought seismic changes in the relations between several ethnic
communities around the world. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
have led to multiple ethnic wars." McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 25, at 94.
222 KUPER, supra note 215, at 209. Along these lines, in Africa, "more attention
needs to be paid to the root causes of conflict, and to supporting those countries which
have shown a willingness to adopt more representative rule." Purvis, supra note 145.
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However, if such optimistic political goals prove impossible,
an awareness of the dangers may allow early intervention once the
conflict erupts, saving lives and halting the spread of violence. In
order to achieve this, there must be some kind of early warning
system. 223 Impartial information gathering could uncover evidence
of mounting repression, increasing polarization, or other threats to
ethnic, racial or religious groups. 224 To be effective, though, "[i]t
would need to be linked with procedures to forewarn, to monitor,
and to initiate preliminary preventative action.
225
What kind of action is appropriate and who might intervene is
unclear. To some extent the answer will depend on the context
and scope of the problem. However, it is clear that providing
emergency humanitarian aid only after the worst violence is
neither a morally nor economically sound strategy. The
magnitude of human suffering produced by genocidal and pre-
genocidal conflicts simply increases with time and ultimately, as
in the Rwandan genocide, leads to overwhelming numbers of
refugees who end up dependent on Western support. 226 Again,
military intervention has its own costs and risks which must be
assessed in the context of the specific event. However, early
military deployment in Rwanda "would have cost a fraction of the
millions of dollars it took ... to maintain the ... refugees. 227
There are other reasons besides cost to be concerned with the
increasing numbers of refugees. Kurt Jonassohn, in the 1993
article Famine, Genocide and Refugees, suggested that the flow of
refugees, in some cases, may itself be evidence that a subtle and
insidious form of genocide is taking place.2 ' Thus, he suggests,
the movement of refugees could be an early sign of a coming
223 See KUPER, supra note 215, at 218.
224 See id.
225 Id. As argued above, this kind of evidence was available about the situation in
Rwanda, yet it was not tied into a mechanism that could trigger decisive international
action. See supra notes 136-64 and accompanying text.
226 See id.
227 Id.
228 See Kurt Jonassohn, Famine, Genocide and Refugees, Soc'Y, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at
72. "Until recently, there has been little awareness of the fact that refugees fleeing from




genocidal catastrophe.229  Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire serve as
vivid illustrations of this supposition. °
Belated humanitarian aid, then, is an ineffective tool for
dealing with genocide. However, the alternative of military
intervention is highly controversial. A fundamental question is
who should ultimately be responsible for intervening. Some
commentators suggest that the burden, at least in the context of
upheavals brought about by decolonization, should lie with the
European colonial powers most responsible for the current
instability. 23 These powers are likely to maintain continuing
interests in the region, as Europe continues to be a primary
consumer of agricultural and mineral exports from Africa.232
Arguably, individual European powers, as opposed to the United
Nations itself, would be most competent to provide peacekeeping
and development support to their former colonies since they know
the language and have scholars and specialists familiar with the
regions.21 "If anybody is competent to deal sympathetically with
229 See id. "Understanding the deliberate use of starvation as a form of persecution
should and can have wide-ranging consequences for action. It forcefully brings out the
fact that humanitarian supplies reach the victims only rarely." Id. Jonassohn suggests
that the supplies intended to provide humanitarian relief are more likely to be sold or
bartered to arm the persecutors. See id. He contends that U.N. decisions about aid
should be informed by an analysis of the refugee flows and famines as potentially
related to genocide, rather than as isolated events. See id.
230 The refugee crises today are also reminiscent of a problem which turned out to
be a precursor to the Jewish Holocaust. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 42, at 12-13.
Following the upheaval of World War I, the new states formed from the Romanov and
Hapsburg empires became home to people who were now national minorities-apatrides
or stateless persons. See id. International conferences were held on the "refugee
problem," recognizing the danger that these minorities held uncertain political and legal
rights. See id. Then, as now, there was also concern about unwarranted interference in
the internal affairs of the new states. See id. "The stateless could neither be assimilated
nor, in most cases, expelled .... There seemed to be no solution. In reality, there was a
'solution' that was obvious to Hitler." Id. at 16-17. Also see HANNAH ARENDT, THE
ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIASM 268-87 (1951) for further discussion of the "Nation of
Minorities" and stateless people.
23! See Pfaff, supra note 64, at 5. Colonial intervention in many cases disrupted the
existing political and social structures of the society. See id. Upon decolonization, the
former colonies were left without stable functioning political systems and legal
institutions. See id.
232 See id.
233 See id. Reportedly, Italian and French peacekeepers warned against attempting
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these countries, the Europeans are." '234
Leo Kuper, author of The Prevention of Genocide, also
supports the responsibility of individual or groups of nations to
intervene, even militarily, in lieu of action by the United
Nations.235 He suggests that:
given the many failures of the United Nations to act against
regimes engaging in continuous massacres of their subjects,...
there is a great need for individual nations, . . . to reassert under
carefully defined conditions the right of humanitarian
intervention against genocide and other gross, consistent, and
236
murderous violations of human rights.
Regardless of the need, however, such unilateral action would be
illegal under the present U.N. Charter.237
Antithetically, other analysts reject these arguments and urge
that the sole power and responsibility for military intervention
should rest with the. United Nations. 238 Intervention by individual
nations, even those with past colonial ties to the troubled region,
may, in fact, be a pretense to disguise ulterior agendas. 9 Such
to impose "American-style solutions" in Somalia. Id. The Italians, as Somalia's former
colonial rulers, knew the country and the people. Similarly, the French are intimately
familiar with west and central Africa. See id.
234 Id.
235 See KUPER, supra note 215, at 226-27.
236 Id. at 226. According to Kuper, humanitarian intervention by individual
governments should be allowed when:
1. the United Nations fails to take action under its peacekeeping machinery
(where the genocide raises a threat to peace), or by the exercise of other
powers in cases of the more purely domestic genocides;
2. a regional intergovernmental organization, with interests in the area,
similarly fails to act; and
3. the offending regime is deaf to appeals.
Id. at 226-27.
237 The Charter provides that "all Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. The U.N. Security Council may elect to
use military force under Chapter VII of the Charter. See supra note 36 for the text of
Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 42. It should be noted, however, that procedures for the
amendment of the Charter are provided for in Articles 108 and 109.
231 See Destexhe, supra note 9, at 17.
239 See id.; see also supra notes 100-03 (discussing the RPF's concerns about
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intervention could be characterized as a return to the "gunboat
diplomacy" of the nineteenth century.24 However, because the
intervening country will likely seek United Nation's approval for
their unilateral intervention, the action acquires a legitimacy which
may or may not be warranted.24' Support for unilateral action in
lieu of United Nations intervention raises several concerns: First,
in such a case, impartiality is important but not assured; second,
the mere existence of historical ties does not guarantee that one
country will act in the best interests of the other; 2 42 and finally, the
populations with little strategic importance may be abandoned and
ignored.243 In order to combat these dangers, then, "it should be up
to the Security Council to decide when a force should be deployed,
and then it should have the capacity to deploy it." 
2
One of the strongest arguments for unilateral action, however,
is the great difficulty attending the deployment of a United
Nations military force. The United Nations must rely on its
member nations to supply troops and equipment for any United
Nations action.14  This arduous process often results in delays,
wasted time, and ultimately an ill-prepared force lacking in
equipment and staff.24 In emergencies such as the genocide in
Rwanda, intervention requires a force which can be rapidly
mobilized and deployed. Thus, when time is of the essence, the
current clumsy process is predestined to failure.
One alternative to this currently inadequate process would be
Operation Turquoise, the French intervention in Rwanda).
240 Destexhe, supra note 9, at 17.
241 See id.
242 See id. This is especially true when there has been a history of exploitation. See
id. Nevertheless, historical ties and geographic proximity have been the foundation for
recent unilateral intervention: "Russia was given the green light to mediate in Georgia,
France in Rwanda, and the United States in Haiti, while in Liberia, the ECOWAS
(Economic Community of West African States) Ceasefire Monitoring Group is
dominated by neighboring Nigeria." Id. at 16-17.
243 See id.
244 Id.
245 See id. at 16.
246 See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the obstacles
faced in outfitting the U.N. relief force eventually sent to Rwanda.
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the creation of a United Nations standing army.24' The idea hadsupport from the former United Nations Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who has called for the creation of such a
force that could be deployed more efficiently to defuse conflicts
such as the one in Rwanda.ff
While such a force would give the United Nations an effective
means to intervene in the increasing number of genocidal
situations, critics are skeptical.e ' Arguments that the United
Nations is "bloated and wasteful," and thus incompetent to
command a permanent force hold sway, particularly in the United
States.nd The specters of Somalia and Vietnam are still powerful,
sparking fears that a permanent U.N. military force "would suck
U.S. forces into prolonged conflicts that have nothing to do with
American security interests. ' t Perhaps in response to these
concerns, President Clinton has proposed an all-African force, to
be used to intervene in crises on the continent like the one in
Rwanda."to Although the force would have the benefit of U.S.
assistance with organization and training, the troops would come
from African nations.it Of course, this proposal, prompted by the
instability in Central Africa, does not address the dangers of ethnic
violence in other areas of the globe. Thus, this proposal ignores
the broader questions of international responsibility for ethnic
conflict.
247 See Destexhe, supra note 9, at 16.
248 See A United Nations Army? Pro & Con, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 5, 1996, at 45. The former Secretary-General's proposal would have predesignated





252 See All Things Considered: Clinton Proposes All-African Military Force (NPR
radio broadcast, Oct. 7, 1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File. The
administration had found support in Africa for an African peacekeeping force, dubbed
the Africa Crisis Response Force. See id. However, before the election last November,
the proposal did not seem to have much support from Republicans in Congress. See id.
Critics pointed out that the President's proposal was unclear on how the force would





As this Comment has argued, dangerous political contexts
which endanger the survival of groups based on racial, ethnic, or
religious grounds are becoming more common and increasingly
destructive, both to the victims and for the stability of the globe.
As the voice of the international community, the United Nations is
the most appropriate body to intervene and seek to prevent these
conflicts. However, as recent conflicts have demonstrated, the
United Nations has lacked the means and the will to act decisively.
The United Nations and its member states must devise a program
of action, whether in the form of a permanent U.N. military force
or through some other method. Even though the Genocide
Convention provides for the prevention and suppression of
genocide, without some concrete plan for action the international
community will remain powerless in the face of this inhuman
crime.
VIII. Conclusion
The purpose of this Comment has been to draw attention to the
problem of genocide in the late twentieth century. While genocide
has occurred throughout history, it is now defined as a crime and
condemned by the international community. When the visual
images of skeletal, almost inhuman Holocaust survivors were
projected at the Nuremberg trials, horrified witnesses must have
felt an overwhelming sense of outrage.254 This outrage and the
world's rejection of the Nazi atrocities were ultimately manifested
in the Genocide Convention. Yet, in 1994, as brutal images of
slaughter in Rwanda were transmitted around the world via
television, newspaper, and magazines, the international
community's leaders were able to resist the mandate of the
Convention and of history. In light of this resistance, it remains to
ask: What level of horror would compel intervention?255
DORINDA LEA PEACOCK
254 During the trial at Nuremberg, the prosecution introduced films depicting the
liberation of the concentration camps, showing the now familiar images of bulldozers
filling ditches with thousands of emaciated corpses. See Powell, supra note 54, at 53.
255 See Judging War Criminals, supra note 187, at B6.
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